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Framework of Analysis 
Research and development (R&D) performs a crucial dual role in advanced capitalist 
economies. It serves to generate knowledge and promote the development of new 
ideas into products, processes and services (called “innovations”) that drive economic 
growth. It can also entrench monopoly power within the large firms that undertake 
massive R&D spending and then patent or copyright the results. These two roles have 
become embedded in the modern corporation and form the essence of the political 
economy of R&D. Both roles are reflected in the work of the first major researcher on 
innovation, Joseph Schumpeter.  
 
In Schumpeter’s first analysis in 1911, he identified the entrepreneurial process in 
terms of the small capitalist who drives new ideas into the market place while 
destroying old products and processes (“creative destruction”, Schumpeter, 1934), and 
this seemed to be consistent with the form of capitalism observed by economists 
through the 19th Century. The innovative activity is seen to be exogenous to the firm 
(especially the characteristics of the entrepreneur), in what has been referred to as 
Schumpeter Mark I. At the time, this analysis ignored the nascent rise of the R&D 
process within corporations instituted by Thomas Edison through his R&D laboratory 
and factory set up in Memlo Park, New Jersey in 1876. By the early 1940s, 
Schumpeter recognised the institutionalisation of R&D in sustaining the monopoly 
power of large corporations to the point that he was concerned that this process would 
see the end of the entrepreneur as R&D becomes a purely bureaucratic activity 
(Schumpeter, 1942). This raised the spectre of Schumpeter Mark II with “creative 
accumulation” from minor incremental innovative activity that is endogenous to the 
large corporation. 
 
Galbraith (1967) developed further the Schumpeter Mark II analysis by identifying 
R&D as the endogenous innovation process which attempts to manage the problems 
of both market and technical uncertainty that emerge out of any new products and 
processes. In this way the large corporation’s “technostructure” sets up strategic 
planning and related investment commitments in the context of secrecy and 
intellectual property rights from R&D-generated innovations. Courvisanos (2005a) 
recognised the interaction of the Mark I and II processes as advanced capitalism 
moves into the 21st Century, where the small innovative firm complements the R&D 
process within large firms. Many of the new ideas refined in the R&D process are 
identified and initially developed by small firms who are closer to the customer and 
the market place. The large firms set up their R&D through collaborations with, or 
acquisitions of, small firms.  
 
This paper aims to examine the political economy role of R&D in the context of the 
innovation dilemma between its role as a knowledge generating processes and the 
entrenched power that such knowledge creates. Williams (1980, pp. 149-69) provides 
the analytical framework for this political economy approach by identifying a pattern 
of three structures within society; dominant in which power presently resides, residual 
(or of marginal concern) in which society has overtaken or passed, and emergent in 
which power is being increasingly arrogated. These are overlapping structures that are 
contingent on the political economic situation in individual countries and their 
internal regions, as well as the broader global context. After defining R&D, various 
aspects of R&D will be examined by this triple structure with reference to the 
innovation dilemma; they are investment, measurement, technological innovation, 
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public policies, globalisation and ethics. The paper concludes with an overview of the 
patterns of R&D that can be identified using the triple structure. 
 
What is R&D? 
R&D is a complete process “…whereby new and improved products, processes, 
materials, and services are developed and transferred to a plant and/or market. 
Typically, this process is represented in the firm by a number of formally organized 
laboratories, departments, groups, teams and functions…most easily 
recognized…involve scientists and engineers.” (Burgelman et al., 1996, p.2) 
Rosenberg (1982, p. 120) sees this as “a learning process” in the generation of new 
technical knowledge. The early Edison-type R&D involved purely corporate in-house 
learning, which all major corporations set up after the Second World War, whether in 
the form of the ubiquitous laboratory for manufacturing or more diversely as ‘new 
product development’ within the marketing department. In the service sector, the 
locus of learning activities occurs often in groups called ‘business development’ or 
‘technology’. Smaller firms also have R&D activities appearing under the titles of 
‘design’ or ‘technical support’. All the above require the exchange of information 
across organisational boundaries within the firm, called ‘closed innovation’ system.  
 
Since the early 1990s, R&D has increasingly involved an ‘open innovation’ system 
through distributed innovation processes that leverage knowledge from a broad 
variety of sources outside the firm itself, including university academic research, 
contracting research from ‘centres of excellence’, joint venture consortiums, acquired 
entrepreneurial firms and licensing of innovations. Thus, boundaries for firms 
conducting R&D have broadened widely under cost pressures and the evolution of the 
Internet with its supporting web-enabling technologies. “Increasingly firms are 
acknowledging that it is difficult for them to create and exploit technological 
innovations on their own.” (Bowonder et al., 2005, p. 51) 
 
Research [R] is scientific or technological investigation that has the potential to lead 
to an idea or concept for innovation. This research is conducted usually by specific 
experts in two different stages. Basic research is exploratory with no preconceived 
outcome or direction, and no clearly identified practical applications, but needs to 
have present or potential interest to the organisation conducting the investigation. This 
research is associated with scientific discovery or, more generally, knowledge-
building. Applied research has preconceived goals based on business imperatives 
related to specific products, processes or service delivery. This research is problem-
solving and needs to take basic research into practical applications that have 
indefinable private and/or social returns that relate to strategic positioning of the 
organisation. In an open innovation system, such R involves learning from other 
technical experts in the variety of sources identified above. 
 
Development [D] explores the specific potential of a product, process or service 
within an experimental testing environment. This work needs to be conducted at the 
interface between the technical experts, logistical production managers and marketing 
departments. Two stages can be identified. First is blueprints development, where a 
set of designs for specific outcomes are developed from the theoretical research. This 
is followed by prototype development, which creates test models for technical 
feasibility (McDaniel, 2002, p. 80). In all stages of D there is need for continual 
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feedback to R in order to improve the theory. This is an iterative process with many 
failures and dead ends along the way, but is essentially a linear innovation process. 
 
Distinct from the R&D process for this discussion is the related “demonstration” and 
“promotion” of the innovation, followed by the business investment required to bring 
forward this innovation into the market place. This is called technological 
commercialisation and is best described in Jolly (1997). Nevertheless, Jolly (1997, p. 
377) notes that all the stages in the commercialisation process need to have significant 
input and feedback with R&D units. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) call this the “chain-
linked model of innovation” that specifically links all the elements of R&D in an 
evolutionary feedback learning process with all the production and distribution units 
in the organisation, together with collaborations outside the organisation. “In the end, 
what companies get out of investments in R&D depends on how they manage 
different stages of the research process itself, and how they get other parts of the 
organisation to contribute to the innovation process.” (Jolly, 1997, p. 363, original 
emphasis) 
 
Investment in R&D 
R&D expenditure is often referred to as spending, yet conceptually the funds 
allocated to R&D should be recognised as investment in the future in the same way as 
investment in plant and equipment. Even failed R&D projects contribute to the corpus 
of knowledge by identifying what does not work and creates further problems to be 
solved with further investigations. Basic research is the most creative stage of R&D 
investment, with the “…more intractable the problem, the more one is curious about 
it.” (Jolly, 1997, p.375) In this way, R&D spending is a significant part of what 
economists now call “intangible investment” because it is an investment into future 
production but the knowledge-base that such investment creates is not tangible and 
obvious as plant and equipment (capital) investment (Webster, 1999).  
 
All forms of investment need to be evaluated on the basis of rates of return to be 
obtained in the future. The future is uncertainty, so any calculation of future returns is 
subject to imprecision. With capital investments on known products or processes, 
there are standard forecast techniques for calculation of rates of return. R&D is aimed 
at generating something new that was previously unknown or not present. Given the 
complexities involved in this process, the outcomes of R&D investment are subject to 
fundamental uncertainty with no probability distributions available, such that standard 
forecast techniques are inappropriate (Davidson, 1991).  
 
Fundamental uncertainty is evident when the elements of R&D investment are broken 
down into their component parts. The various stages of R&D identified above all have 
different outputs, each one is difficult to evaluate and has diverse possible outcomes. 
Thus, evaluation depends on the judgement of experts at the various R&D stages. 
However, Mansfield et al. (1972) in a classic study identified that these experts tend 
(when they are planning) to greatly underestimate development costs, while they 
greatly overestimate the time taken to produce results. Then, Tidd et al. (2005, p. 218) 
noted that scientists and engineers in basic and applied ‘R’ are often deliberately 
overoptimistic in their estimates in order to give the illusion of a high rate of return to 
conservative accountants and managers. As a result, R&D management requires a 
much more effective communication between R&D staff and the persons responsible 
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for allocation of financial resources, as well as seeking outside advice on the 
management of the R&D portfolio (Ettlie, 2000, p. 149). 
 
The Mansfield study of project selection in large US firms, comparing forecasts to 
outcomes found that the probability of picking winners by the technostructures in 
these firms was only 16 per cent. Jolly (1997), 25 years later, confirms that the 
Mansfield results still stand even with the advances in modern computer technology. 
Thus, despite attempts to manage market and technical uncertainty, the 
technostructure generally fails. This leads large firms to protect any successful 
innovations in order to maximise returns over as long a period as possible. Such 
protection can be legal (like secrecy and patents) and illegal (like cartel 
arrangements), creating monopoly power for that period of protection.1
 
 This role of 
the technostructure can be identified as the dominant structure attempting to quell any 
possible emerging threats.   
Measurement of R & D 
R&D is measured in three ways; input, output and capacity. From the process context 
there is a set of input measures of R&D, notably: R&D expenditure (or spending) in 
absolute monetary figures, R&D intensity as a ratio of R&D expenditure to sales 
turnover, number of R&D employees, and technological capability in terms of R&D 
stock. R&D expenditure is a common absolute measure of financial commitment, 
while R&D intensity takes this spending figure and provides a relative measure in 
relation to sales. Employee numbers gives some notion of human resource capability, 
while technological capability is better measured by the R&D stock built up in the 
organisation. Dominant and residual structures residing in large manufacturing sectors 
like automobiles and electronics are strongly represented in the absolute input 
measure, while rising industries like biotechnology are represented strongly in the 
relative input measure. 
 
For the output of creative and intellectual effort, there is a different set of R&D 
measures. Most common in marketing terms is the number of sales of new (up to 5 
years after launch) products relative to total annual sales. R&D productivity measured 
by income from new products relative to R&D expenditure (lagged 3-5 years) is a 
favourite of the accountants who allocate R&D funds. From a more technical 
perspective there is R&D output intensity measured by the number of patent 
applications to real (deflated) R&D investment. At a purely scientific level, there is 
the number of scientific articles published in quality science journals and the extent 
that these articles are cited over the following few years. Finally, technology licences 
issued to other firms is an indication of the extent of diffusion of the R&D innovation, 
but this is generally viable as a measure only where the technology can be easily 
‘unbundled’ and adopted by other firms with different institutions and culture. 
 
Building technological capacity for effective R&D can also be measured, but by more 
qualitative indicators from inside and outside the firm. Internal indicators identify the 
extent of technical expertise, focus on end-user needs, cross-functional and fluid 
                                                 
1 For example, in June 2004 the US Congress extended copyright on music from 50 to 95 years in order 
to protect the commercial interests of recorded popular ‘rock’ music (the Sonny Bono amendment). 
This date was not coincidently one month before the first major ‘rock’ recording, Elvis Presley’s 
“That’s All Right Mama”, was about to run out of copyright since it was released on the 19th July 1954 
(The Sunday Age, 2004). 
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research teams, strategic focus and formal development processes (see Menke, 1997). 
External indicators identify specific capacity-building R&D structures; especially lead 
user groups (see von Hippel, 2005), innovation networks, research consortia, strategic 
alliances and joint ventures related to market developments (see Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 
296-315). These R&D activities can be identified with the emergent structures in 
areas like pharmaceuticals and telecommunications arising chiefly out of the growth 
of external sources of R&D under the distributed innovation process (Bowonder, 
2005, pp. 51-2).  
 
The most difficult to measure is R&D done not under the banner of ‘R&D’. 
Particularly, this is the case in two areas. One is ‘informal R&D’ undertaken in less 
organised and ad hoc basis (e.g. trouble shooting on the production line). In many 
countries, especially large ones, informal R&D is regarded as too difficult to survey 
(Pavitt, 1994), whereas some small countries like Australia survey all size firms for 
all forms of R&D (Bryant, 1998, p.59 fn.4). The other is service-based and some 
product-based efforts in innovation which use electronic information technology for 
investigation and testing. Rosenberg (1982, p. 191) identified this problem a long time 
ago when he said: “Software development shares many of the problems of any R&D 
activity.” Freeman (1994) noted the rise of information technology as an area of 
innovation itself did not come out of identifiable R&D activities. Bowonder et al. 
(2002) identify the emergence of e-engineering and e-design for innovation as central 
to R&D but not measured in current R&D metrics. 
 
R & D and Technological Innovation 
There is a major debate over the issue of R&D as the source of significant 
technological innovation. Source of creativity by R&D is a two-edged sword for the 
technostructure. The technology imperative demands from the technostructure two 
conflicting actions. It needs to maximise the gains from any successful innovation 
developed in-house, while focusing on radical innovations for a distinctive 
competitive edge. Tension exists between the two scenarios for R&D, incremental or 
radical innovation: Incremental represents minor improvements on existing products 
or processes that require little organisational change, while radical innovation 
represents revolutionary departure from current operations with significantly different 
skills and capabilities.   
 
On the one side there is the recognition that incremental innovation provides ‘extra’ 
profits from successfully introduced radical innovations with only marginal R&D 
input. Financial managers encourage incremental innovation, since it can be calibrated 
easier with simple ‘rules-of-thumb’ for allocating resources, establishing sunset 
criteria for projects and using sensitivity analysis based on a known range of 
assumptions while reducing key uncertainties before commitment (Tidd et al., 2005, 
pp. 218-20). This is an organisational constraint where financial shackles stymies 
innovative edge as financial controllers seek short-term gains. Chiesa (2001) in his 
guide to R&D management argues for commitment of funds for R&D in the 
incremental innovations of existing corporate technologies. New technological 
opportunities require difficult overall corporate strategic planning changes that need 
first to overcome organisational constraints by realigning a firm’s strategic plan to 
some core technological focus. For example, are automobile manufacturers in the 
business of individual people movers or the petrol-driven vehicles? The latter limits 
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their strategic focus to a narrow technological focus with only incremental innovation 
possible.  
 
This ‘incrementalism’ is further entrenched by marketing efforts and monopoly 
power. Professional R&D executives recognise the role of marketing in its interaction 
with lead users of the products in setting the R&D agendas. This is done not only by 
standard marketing ‘research’ surveys, but increasingly more prevalent has become 
collaboration with lead users on finding what such users ‘need’ to improve use of 
their products, e.g. mountain bikes and computer software (von Hippel, 2005). 
Monopoly power of secrecy and property rights aim to stifle radical innovation being 
conducted by smaller entrepreneurial firms or even in-house radical ideas which 
threaten the current strong market position of the dominant firm(s). Lessig (2004) has 
argued this case very persuasively with strong empirical evidence from the media 
industry. For example, RCA squashed all attempts by their R&D engineer, Edwin 
Armstrong, to introduce the higher quality FM radio band; all RCA wanted was to 
protect their monopoly of the AM band by reducing the static noise on the AM band 
(Lessig, 2004, pp. 3-7).  
 
On the other side, there is evidence that radical innovations are significantly more 
likely to be commercially successful (Ettlie and Rubenstein, 1987). This is because 
the accumulated firm-specific intangible knowledge for future opportunities (first 
mover advantage) tends to be greater the more radical the innovation. The difficulty is 
assessing which ideas will eventually succeed and having to pursue many on the 
expectations that one will succeed. There is no probability distribution and thus no 
calculable risk assessment that can be made for successful radical innovations. Ettlie 
(2000, p. 40) estimates that only 6-10 per cent of all new successful products are 
radical, while successful radical processes are even scarcer. Also, radical processes 
tend to follow radical products with a lag, but then both technologies become 
entrenched and lose their ‘cutting edge’ (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). Focusing 
on radical innovations will not only require a considerable shift in skill capability and 
organisational structure, but it also introduces the threat of new entrants (some very 
large with ‘deep pockets’) into the industry who are prepared to diffuse the 
innovation. Concentration on radical R&D requires brave foresight on the part of 
established business. 
 
Up to the early 1960s R&D was funded directly from central corporate sources. This 
has become a residual structure as there arose a growing movement to fund from 
contracts between the R&D division and other internal and external business ‘groups’. 
For example, Philips (with 5 labs around the world) began in 1990 to have its funding 
from head office reduced to one-third, with the remainder coming from contracts from 
business groups (Jolly, 1997, p. 346). This trend threatens creative R&D in radical 
innovations and tends to support incremental innovation driven by contract-based 
strategic marketing needs. Philips, realising this, modified their funding structure in 
1994, requiring roughly half of the two-thirds controlled by business groups to be 
“…devoted to immediate product development; the remaining half has to be for 
longer-term capability development in certain technology clusters, such as signal 
processing for TVs. Typically, this part is funded by more than one business group as 
well.” (Jolly, 1997, p. 349) This is the nub of the dilemma, determining how R&D 
strategies address both short-term market-based needs and long-term knowledge-
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accumulation needs. This all depends on the valuation of strategic intent by the firm 
undertaking R&D. 
 
The valuation of strategic intent is influenced by two factors. One is the life-cycle of 
the current radical innovation. During the early stages of a successful innovation, 
incremental changes out of R&D result in substantial gains for the firm and in terms 
of social benefit as the innovation is adapted and diffused. Then as the innovation 
matures, R&D tends to suffer diminishing returns in terms of new knowledge and new 
applications. At this mature stage defensive R&D efforts aim to maintain market 
position (Bar, 2006). The other factor is the size of the firm. Ettlie and Rubenstein 
(1987) examined 348 US manufacturing firms and identified smaller firms (up to 
1,000 employees) as introducing at the same rate both radical and incremental new 
products, then as firms increase their size up to 11,000 employees their greater size 
tends to promote more radicalness. When firms become very large (greater than 
11,000 employees) and the technostructure becomes powerful, there is a clear lack of 
radical product innovation despite often very large R&D units. 
 
R & D Public Policies 
Central to all nations’ industrial and innovation public policy strategy is the approach 
government’s take to funding and supporting R&D. Gerschenkron (1962) associates 
such strategy with the ‘late’ industrial development stage of the global economy. The 
economics literature has identified four rationales for such emphasis on supporting 
what is essentially a private sector activity. The first is the neoclassical supply-
oriented competition concerns arising from ‘market failure’, developed most notably 
by Arrow (1962). This argument is based on inadequate return for the private sector in 
R&D due to few and uncertain pay-offs from basic research. As noted, large firm 
R&D tends to support incrementalism, because there is limited market-based 
encouragement for more uncertain new technologies in less powerful industries and 
firms where the scale of R&D is too low to generate the critical mass of new 
knowledge. Also, duplication by competitors tends to quickly undermine any 
competitive edge established by the initiator (free rider issue). From the nation’s 
standpoint, these problems of market failure lead to underinvestment in R&D. 
 
The second rationale centres on national security issues developed by Gansler (1980). 
Ability to be self-sufficient in circumstances of secrecy on defence (and space 
program) strategies drives this concern (offensive). It is bolstered by concerns of 
being cut-off or refusal to trade during military conflicts (defensive). R&D spending, 
due to secrecy and lack of direct civilian applicability, can not be supported in private 
markets. This R&D is financed by the public sector, but developed in the private 
sector, with the use of procurements to drive down R&D costs. In the long-run the 
knowledge gained provides a platform for new civilian capabilities far into the future 
(e.g. computers, GPS, commercial space travel). This has been the case throughout 
history, but clearly at different rates of civilian uptake (White, 2005).  
 
The third rationale is based on evolutionary economics, centred on a systems 
approach that rejects the linear model of R&D. The national innovation system is a set 
of institutions whose complex interaction via clusters, collaborations and networks 
across the public-private sector space determine the extent of innovative performance 
(Nelson, 1992). In this system, R&D forms the foundation of knowledge and its 
applicability for innovation. However, systemic failures in private sector R&D due to 
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lock-in, transitional problems, poor knowledge-based infrastructure, and inappropriate 
conventions and institutions justify the need for national governments to overcome 
these failures in a strategic way (Smith, 1998). For example, private sector R&D 
support for small firms with single innovation ideas are hard to justify on financial 
grounds because the chances of success before any patents expire are very low (Legge 
and Hindle, 2004, p. 337). 
 
The final rationale is based on environmental concerns. Exhaustion of non-renewable 
resources and pollution threaten the environment’s ecosystem viability, while markets 
do not reflect the ecological value of sustainability of human and other life on this 
planet. Thus, there is a need for public finance and support of R&D on decentralised 
alternative new energy sources and reducing pollution (McDaniel, 2002, p.85). 
Neoclassical and evolutionary economists could claim this argument for their 
respective market or systemic failure arguments, however ecological economists see 
the ecosystem overriding both such approaches. A market failure approach can merely 
encourage the public support of R&D into costly and unsustainable ‘end-of-pipe’ 
technological solutions. A systemic failure approach to work from this environmental 
perspective needs R&D that has clear ecological directions and rules that allow for 
adaptation and incremental change towards a decentralised sustainable ecosystem 
(rather than support, for example, of massive centralised nuclear power and corporate 
genetic engineering, see Skea, 1994). 
 
Two types of R&D public policies are possible, passive and active (Legge and Hindle, 
2004, pp.237-50). Passive policies respect laissez-faire market solutions by 
attempting to override market failures, giving markets a better chance to work 
effectively. This would involve intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection of R&D 
innovation to overcome the free rider issue, and providing broad R&D rebates, 
subsidies and incentives in order to reduce risk and support scale economies. This is 
the neoclassical approach to R&D public policies. Cannon (2005) explains that the 
USA, as the leader in R&D, has strong preference for passive R&D policies and notes 
the four successful R&D instruments are (in order of importance): tax relief, defence 
support, patent protection, and college education. The paradox of passivity by not 
picking winners and yet supporting massive defence R&D does not seem to be 
apparent in Cannon’s analysis, but this is to be expected from the perspective of the 
dominant structure that inhabits R&D in the USA. A more recent variation of this 
neoclassical “passive” approach has been policies to shift R&D support from large 
corporations towards small business (through programs for technology start-up 
companies like pre-seed funding and incubators). Though the conservatives could 
suggest this change is due to market failure as large corporations override the market, 
such a post hoc rationale undermines the whole passive approach and leads directly to 
active policies. 
 
Active policies aim to directly intervene in order to influence the direction and extent 
of R&D innovation. Sectoral R&D assistance to specific industries aims to address 
concerns of the lack of innovation in this area (e.g. CSIRO as the Australian public 
research body in support essentially of the agricultural sector). Selective public 
investment in research infrastructure (e.g. synchrotrons, technology parks, cooperative 
university-business research centres), subsidies in specific areas of concern 
(environment, social groups, non-urban regions) and public sector procurement of 
R&D (as in defence industry) all provide direction as part of public policy support. 
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All rationales bar neoclassical tend to support such active policies, with the particular 
direction of R&D support up for debate at the political level (centralised authority or 
democratic grassroots). The proponents of such active policies argue on the basis that 
these are emergent structures which will eventually dominant.                                                                                     
 
In reality, R&D public policies end up being a mix of both passive and active, 
depending on the political trajectory that a nation has traversed over the last fifty 
years. The trend of R&D policies will reflect the rationale which is being championed 
by the political powers at the time. There are, however, some theoretical limitations to 
R&D support by the state. In relation to subsidy/incentive-type support, successful 
R&D innovations end up benefiting the private sector firm involved twice, once from 
financial support and second from profits of the innovation often with state-endorsed 
monopoly control through IPRs. Concern also exists as producers of R&D get 
exclusive benefits of the IPRs, when often it is users who generate the innovative 
ideas but all benefits go to producer who also gets patent (and other) IPR protection 
(see von Hippel, 2005).2
 
 
Questions are also raised about governments’ attempts to ‘boost’ R&D when it is used 
merely as a marketing tool for incremental innovation (How many blades can you 
place on razor shaver?). This is supported by evidence that incumbent enterprises, 
with minor innovative activity, benefit most from such R&D public support during 
long economic expansions; whereas new firm start-ups are triggered by economic 
contraction and unemployment supported by university research in particular 
(Audretsch and Acs, 1994). At the other extreme with radical innovation, there is the 
growing neo-liberal influence in many western economies to encourage support for 
small-based entrepreneurial start-ups based on some “…exaggerated claims of their 
role in innovation” (Legge and Hindle, 2004, p. 247), when in fact the vast majority 
of entrepreneurial start-ups are extensions of work conducted prior to start-up (Bhidé, 
2000). Further, Åsterbo (2003) shows evidence of unrealistic optimism in a sample of 
1,091 independent inventions, with only between 7-9% reaching the market and 60% 
of them obtaining negative returns.3
 
 
Empirical evidence on R&D support is mixed. Bloom et al. (2002) draws the 
conclusion from a nine major OECD-country study that generally R&D tax credits 
have had a significant effect. However, other studies have found several problems 
with this form of incentive: applies to only new R&D, criteria are stringent, no 
distinction between R&D spending and success rates, productivity effects are varied, 
and ignoring the increasingly important role of collaborations (Ettlie, 2000, pp. 298-
300). Active policies like selective investment (e.g. energy), incubators and 
technology parks have had varying success, depending on how well targeted the 
policy is, how well it is administered and monitored; then there is the level of synergy 
of companies involved with similar and complementary endowments. Finally there is 
the motivation of the participants themselves in these research infrastructures. 
                                                 
2 The problem of IPRs “…being hijacked by larger firms, particularly for strategic purposes” is a public 
policy concern addressed by Dolfsma (2006, p.339). 
3 Audretsch (1995, p. 122) places the above discussion into the US context by stating that “…although 
divergences in beliefs regarding (potential) innovations may induce a greater amount of startup 
activity, the likelihood of any new firm actually surviving and having a substantial impact on the 
industry is relatively low. Thus we observe a relatively high number of entrepreneurial or young firms, 
whose impact is, on average, relatively negligible.” 
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Australia has been notable for selective investment in two major successful 
innovation-based research infrastructures: CSIRO and AIS (Australian Institute of 
Sport). Both have been models that have been studied and copied around the world, 
however, Australia’s natural and cultural endowment in agriculture and sport have 
much to do with this success (Fox, 2001).  
 
A third of OECD countries (all small economies) have public as their major source of 
R&D funding, also all less developed economies depend on government for R&D. 
From this it can be noted that higher education and government sectors perform 
almost 30 per cent of all R&D (OECD, 2005). 
 
Thus, the track record for active policies is mixed. If in concert with major security 
concerns, the military rationale will be successful. The other two active-based 
rationales have had mixed results, with proponents pointing to countries like The 
Netherlands who have been able to develop innovation policies for sustainable 
development. Such success has only been achieved on the back of major 
environmental crisis that the population as a whole comes to accept (Courvisanos, 
2005b).                                                        
 
Globalisation of R & D 
R&D spending is gradually globalising in concert with general business globalisation, 
but not in a straight direct transfer of operations. The form it is taking provides 
massive potential opportunities for democratising the innovation process and reducing 
the dominant structure of the institutionalisation of R&D described above. 
 
The evidence, based on country of origin in front page patent citing and company 
R&D spending data, is quite clear that the majority of R&D by global corporations 
occurs in their home of origin. Only 12 per cent of the world’s large firms conduct 
R&D outside their home country, compared to around 25 per cent equivalent share of 
production. Notably, on average foreign-based production is less innovation-intensive 
than home production, with firms from smaller countries generally having higher 
shares of foreign innovative activities. Most R&D performed outside home sites 
occurs in USA and Germany, with a growing trend in biotechnology and IT for 
European firms to conduct R&D in USA so as to access local skills and knowledge 
(Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 211-13). Meyer-Krahmer and Reger (1999) characterise R&D 
as being in the dominant “Triadization” structure, involving companies from the 
USA, the EU and Japan. OECD (2005) figures indicate at the broader level of 30 
leading economies (excluding China and India), that well over 16 per cent of total 
R&D expenditure is performed abroad by foreign affiliates. The picture that emerges 
is a complex mosaic of rising internationalisation of R&D but with limited “techno-
globalism”. 
 
Domestic country of origin R&D stills matters to large corporations. Tidd et al. (2005, 
pp. 213-16) have identified reasons for this: When launching substantially complex 
new products and processes, there are major efficiency gains from close proximity to 
R&D developments for knowledge integration and dealing with unforseen problems. 
Despite IT linkages, tacit knowledge through close personal contact matters. There 
are very high fixed costs in setting up such R&D infrastructure outside of the 
domestic country or region where R&D originally developed and thus created a strong 
culture and technological trajectory. Spread of R&D depends on the ability of 
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industries to overcome these inherent domestic advantages. Compare the automobile 
industry’s need for some geographically-based R&D (cars for Australian conditions is 
different to Europe and USA) with pharmaceuticals need to be close to basic research 
knowledge from particular knowledge-intensive centres (e.g. universities with 
pharmaceutical research expertise). Matching foreign localisation with highly 
specialised R&D personnel can be difficult and requires significant ability in 
mobilising such staff. Thus, R&D works best at foreign centres with more established 
products and services that have moved considerably down the life-cycle for market-
seeking (‘capability exploiting’, CBE) motives, while embryonic ones stay at home. 
Despite China’s strong economic growth at the beginning of the 21st Century, R&D is 
essentially only at this CBE level (Dahlman and Aubert, 2001, pp. 121-38), with an 
R&D intensity of seven times less than the OECD average (Gilboy, 2004). 
 
In attempts to overcome limitations of R&D direct globalisation, outsourcing and 
collaborative R&D on a more global basis have become a strong trend. The agency 
for this move has been the development of global knowledge networks across the 
private-public sector space for resource-seeking motives. Scientists and engineers 
were the first to develop electronic-based global knowledge networks in military, 
space and then university research, all public sector funded. More recently, business 
firms have found it very useful to tap into these existing knowledge networks and to 
extend them further in what Kuemmerle (1997) calls “capability augmenting” (CBA) 
R&D facilities close to centres of research excellence that these companies are able to 
tap into. European firms tend to follow this CBA approach strongly, with Ambos 
(2005) providing evidence to support this with respect to 134 R&D laboratories of top 
German global firms. These networks link researchers in advanced economies, 
leaving the rest of the world outside these networks.  
 
Outsourcing of non-core R&D activities in incremental innovation has been the major 
form of internationalisation with the links being vertical to suppliers and customers 
(especially lead users) throughout their extended global value chain. Examples of 
such outsourcing partners who can reduce transaction costs are systems integrators, 
technology consultants as well as more traditional suppliers (inputs) and customers 
(marketing). Increased global sourcing and marketing has allowed for more extensive 
and flexible outsourcing arrangements, with loose coupling of multi-technology 
products allowing for uneven rates of advance to be accommodated up and down the 
value chain (Brusconi et al., 2002). 
 
An extensive literature in collaborative R&D identifies a variety of forms, from 
“simple” joint firm cooperation, to competitors R&D consortia, to virtual (electronic) 
collaborations (see Ettlie, 2000, pp. 159-69 for detailed discussion). They tend to be 
associated by way of horizontal links with competitors and work better when 
stimulated to join for reasons such as start-up phase, threat of new entries, or concern 
that maturity has set in. Small innovative firms provide strong synergistic support for 
large firms, with small firms acquiring market knowledge and financial support while 
large firms acquire new technology. Collaborations are increasingly more flexible 
such as strategic alliances (rather than joint ventures) and they are based around 
universities, technology parks, and private consortia. Almost all of the 80 per cent 
growth in technology collaborations since the mid-1980s is accounted for by the high 
technology areas of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and ICT who are particularly 
keen to establish flexible collaborations to allow for technology switching. Aerospace 
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and defence actually have declined their collaborative R&D efforts over the same 
period (Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 318-9). 
 
The above globalisation forces are providing opportunities for a broader group of 
countries, experts and groups to become involved in the R&D process in a more 
democratic way. Strongly developing economies with rising technological expertise 
are being seen as potential by large global firms for access of science and technology 
resources (human and capital) at significantly cheaper cost (Reddy, 1997). For 
countries like India, China and South Korea, this provides an opportunity to integrate 
into global technology systems, but the terms of engagement need to be carefully 
balanced to ensure favourable outcomes for these nations.4
 
 There are also 
opportunities for environmental groups, aid agencies and specific scientific 
communities to become involved in the global knowledge network, not only from the 
greater involvement of lead users championed by von Hippel (2005), but also from 
collaborative and outsourcing arrangements that could influence the development of 
innovation in large corporations over the next century. These are emergent structures 
that need support from governments that can establish active public policies to 
encourage such initiatives. Neo-liberal passive public policies will merely lead to 
R&D being dominated by the needs of global corporations, leaving these more 
democratic processes of innovation only as residual structures in the R&D global 
system. 
Ethical Issues 
The final area of political economy of R&D to be examined is ethics. Ethics is an 
important issue in R&D that has in the past been ignored by the dominant structures 
within the scientific and business R&D communities in their technology-push 
mentality that all research and new knowledge is inherently ‘good’. Philosophers and 
ethists like Peter Singer who have questioned this inherent goodness have been seen 
as ‘cranks’ allowed voicing their minority view in a democracy. In the 21st Century, 
with R&D biotechnology enabling the alteration of human genetics, the ethical issues 
of R&D have been rammed into the front of the R&D community. There are now 
thousands of patents worldwide (except in France) on the human genome, with a 
global alliance human genome project aimed to increase this number dramatically. 
The ethics and economics of such R&D are in conflict, and the low standards in 
modern business ethics (as for example drug trials in India) indicate that corporate 
decision-making will not produce the philosophically desirable outcome. Survival of 
businesses and research staff may not be the best way of ensuring the considered 
long-term implications of altering the world’s gene pool and the ecosystem (see 
Flowers, 1998). 
 
Patterns of R&D 
The dominant structures in R&D are national security concerns and the role of large 
corporations in incrementalism. National security concerns shape innovations systems 
and particularly the R&D component. With national security concerns raised even 
higher after the collapse of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, a priori 
there would seem to be even greater publicly funded support for defence/security 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, the skill base and political regimes in Africa are not conducive to becoming part of 
any such potential emergent R&D structure. Latin America has some potential, especially in Brazil 
where the government is supporting the development of a strong generic pharmaceutical industry to the 
frustration of the major global pharmaceutical firms (Cohen, 2000). 
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based R&D across all economies, but dominated by the USA and UK as they lead the 
anti-terrorism strategy. As well, the monopoly power of large corporations to 
dominate R&D in marketing-based incremental innovation remains. Both structures 
will continue to dominate R&D well into the future.  
 
Residual R&D structures that remain, but are increasingly less relevant, relate purely 
to in-house based creativity and development projects along with capability exploiting 
foreign-based R&D activities in cheaper developing economies where there is some 
strong R&D-based skills. India, for example, has a strong medical training tradition 
which is now being used by the major pharmaceutical companies to assist in 
undertaking R&D drug trials, but with much reduced ethical standards that have 
enraged civil rights defenders. 
 
Emergent R&D structures are centred on services-based areas of knowledge, much of 
it not conducted in official R&D centres. Firms in the new economies of India and 
China are emerging out of technology transfer into their own capability augmenting 
R&D often in concert with collaborative firm partners from established R&D strong 
economies. This provides only a very limited globalisation trend in respect to R&D. 
Lead users and other democratising elements of R&D activities are becoming more 
established in western economies, providing opportunities for a broader constituency 
in developing innovation and challenging the dominant incrementalism. This involves 
more public policy input into the creativity and commercialisation aspects of R&D as 
well as greater public debate on the ethics and global impacts of R&D. From this 
there needs to emerge a broader collaborative R&D innovation process that includes 
alliances and network sharing across a large and diverse range of communities 
interested and affected by R&D development; from conservation groups and trade 
union bodies, to scientists, corporate leaders and entrepreneurs. Emergent structures 
find it difficult to survive and grow in the face of opposing dominant structures of 
‘vertical’ based specialist silos of knowledge. 
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